my interest in hegel’s views on the end of art began in the mid-1970s and resulted in a paper, “a reexamination of the ‘death of art’ interpretation of hegel’s aesthetics,” first presented at a meeting of the hegel society of america and subsequently published in art, and logic in hegel’s philosophy , in 1980.[i] at that time, the “end of art” thesis was more dramatically characterized as “the death of art.” this understanding of hegel was based mainly on a mistranslation of key terms in hegel’s aesthetics in an english translation done in the 1920s by the english scholar osmatson. the english translation by sir t. m. knox, of hegel’s lectures in aesthetics in 1975 served to correct such misleading translations and supports the view that hegel’s did not portend the death of art. based on a careful investigation of hegel’s texts relating to this problem, and an examination of the arguments of scholars (benedetto croce and eric heller) who advanced the death of art thesis, i concluded that, despite complex and sometimes misleading statements, hegel did not intend the end of art in the sense that this idea was popularly understood. by taking certain isolated statements out of context it would be possible to argue that hegel did intend the death of art, for example, when he or his editors cite passages that seem to say that hegel believed that art had come to an end in his time or that its purpose as a means of revealing the truth had been supplanted by religion and philosophy. but, as sir malcom knox pointed out,,hegel also “said that art would continue its task for thousands of years…”[ii]
at the time i did not carry on this discussion with direct applications to modern and contemporary art. yet it seemed clear to me that hegel’s analysis opened up the way for future developments pertaining to the debates over the end of art that have subsequently transpired.
my interpretation of hegel and the end of art is based on the following arguments: 1. the claim that hegel’s metaphysical dialectical principle necessarily produces the death of art is shown to be based on a misapplication of the principle of the dialectic. if one regards dialectic as the key element in hegel’s understanding of the evolution of culture, the system remains open to the possibility of unending change. 2. a review of the texts most likely to support the end of art thesis establishes sufficient qualifications in every case to support an alternative interpretation of the texts. 3. the end of art thesis misunderstands the dissolution in romantic art of subjective and sensuous elements and confuses changes in romantic art with the demise of all art.
hegel argues that art, in concert with religion and philosophy, is an activity of the mind whose task is to reveal spirit, in sensuous form. the disclosure of spirit in the world takes place throughout evolving stages of history. it is to be expected that constant changes in the cultures of the world will be accompanied by changes in art’s role. religion, whose domain is understood as inner feeling, and philosophy, as the highest form of understanding, represent more complete disclosures of the realm of spirit, which for hegel is the ultimate form of being. hegel understood that the relation of these three manifestations (art, religion, and philosophy) of intellectual or spiritual activity changes as culture advances toward a more complete manifestation of spirit.. art, too, functions according to three distinct states: symbolic, classical, and romantic in hegel’s system. in symbolic art, the natural forms and material content dominate the spirit. in classical art the two elements material and spirit are equally balanced to produce a state of harmony. in the romantic mode, the spirit dominates over the material element. it is in discussing the romantic state of art that hegel discloses his thoughts concerning the future of art. here, art achieves a freedom that it lacked in either its symbolic or its classical stages. art is free to explore and express the inner subjective consciousness of the artist, as well as changes in external culture. hegel, in the spirit of the owl of minerva does not speculate about the precise nature of what the art of the future will be, except to note that it is free from the obligations to represent nature or to express religious feeling that occupied earlier art.
here are some of the considerations offered in support of my interpretation of hegel’s view concerning the end of art. the first concerns the principles of dialectic as they pertain to his views on art. (dialectic refers to the unfolding movements of an organic unity referred to as absolute spirit through which spirit is actualized by undergoing transformation moving from nature viewed as an incomplete state of being to spirit or idea. this transformation takes place on both the levels of ontology and in history). croce, eric heller, and israel knox base their arguments for the death of art interpretation on a mechanical view of the role of dialectic. according to their view the death of art is a necessary logical consequence of the dialectical unfolding of
hegels’s absolute spirit. as the dialectic unfolds at this level, we find that beauty in art is a synthesis of the sensuous and the rational, romantic art is a synthesis of symbolic and classical art, and philosophy represents a synthesis of art and religion. art’s demise is proposed on two levels. the appearance of philosophy as the most complete and definitive presentation of absolute spirit is understood to dispense with the need for art. analogously, on another level, the dialectic manifests itself successively in the symbolic, classical, and romantic stages of art until art reaches its outer limits as a viable expression of absolute spirit, resulting in the end of art.
here are three reasons for questioning this view of how dialectic works in reference to art. first, this interpretation is not consistent with hegel’s view of the dialectic because it presumes incorrectly that an advancement in the stages of dialectic evolution from art to philosophy, or from one stage of art to the next, results in annihilation or uselessness of the previous stages. hegel describes the stages of the dialectic in his preface to the phenomenology of mind as equally necessary moments of an organic unity that constitute the life of the whole. hyppolite and other distinguished commentators on hegel’s system have proposed that the stages in hegel’s dialectic move to ever richer developments and “always reproduce within themselves the prior developments and give them new meaning.”[iii] secondly, hegel distinguishes the points of view of the artist and the philosopher, and he clearly distinguishes art from philosophy. the artist’s task is to grasp reality and its forms through alert eyes and ears. although reason acts to enable the artist to relate his perceptions to the idea of absolute spirit, the artist does not comprehend experience in propositions and representations (sätze und vorstellungen) as does the philosopher. rather the artist brings into consciousness the inner core of reason clothed in concrete forms and the expressive individualities of real life. the artist’s representations are so infused with the stamp of emotional life that they even make public a part of the artist’s own inner personality. in doing so the art actualizes an aspect of absolute spirit. a third reason for doubting the death of art interpretation is that art expresses “a unique aspect of the idea” [absolute spirit] itself, that is, beauty. in hegel’s view, beauty is an important element of absolute spirit not expressed by either religion or philosophy if art is indeed the principal means of actualizing beauty, it does not make sense for hegel to posit its end.[iv] hegel’s concern with the classical ideal of beauty as represented in the art of ancient greece, which he seems to have preferred over later developments in the art of his time, is in itself a testimony to his regard for beauty as an attribute of the absolute spirit. moreover, in his aesthetics, hegel refers to beauty as a means of dissolving the opposition of nature and absolute spirit.[v]
. a careful understanding of hegel’s view of the romantic form of art is particularly important to the clarification of the death of art issue. he believed that painting, music and poetry provided the best representations of romantic art. in contrast, architecture was the most fully developed art in its symbolic state, and sculpture provided the most adequate example of classical art.. romantic art for hegel meant medieval and subsequent art reflecting the inner life as opposed to representations of the external world. romantic art thus represented a period of change and transition in art. in some respects, the transitions taking place in the practice of art during hegel’s time must have been as enigmatic to his efforts to work out his aesthetics as are the developments in art today, which perplex aestheticians including arthur danto as they seek to address the changes art is undergoing today. especially troubling to hegel was a sense that romantic art already represented decadence. this perceived decadence in the art of hegel’s time was in part a concern over the increasing role of the forces of reflection or philosophy as a constitutive element in the production of art.[vi]
advocates of the death of art thesis emphasize two themes arising from romantic art, with a corresponding diminishing of the role of art as an autonomous form of absolute spirit. the proponents assert that romantic art consumes the previous forms of art (symbolic and classical). they also point to the alleged disengagement of inner subjective aspects of art from its outer sensuous form as definitive evidence for the death of art understanding of hegel’s aesthetics. with respect to romantic art as a category in hegel’s aesthetics, the development of romantic art signifies first a shift of emphasis from the external sensuous form in art as an approach to absolute spirit to self-conscious subjectivity—the inner world of the ideal and of emotions, soul, and contemplation.[vii] this shift has been understood by the advocates of the death of art thesis as an irrevocable split between two essential elements of art, resulting in art’s permanent dissolution. however, an examination of hegel’s discussion of this point suggests too great an emphasis on the alleged disengagement of the sensory form of art and its and inner subjective elemens. hegel is partly to blame, for his language does at times appear to suggest such a reading. yet a careful perusal of the full context of this discussion shows hegel repeatedly reminding the reader of the continuing necessity for a vital relation between the sensuous and the subjective in art.[viii] if hegel appears to give greater prominence to the inner subjective aspect of art here, it is to emphasize a difference between classical and romantic art. hegel finds too little involvement of the personal subjective life in classical art. by comparison romantic art satisfies this need by deemphasizing the visible sensuous element in art. however, romantic art is compelled to operate in the realms of both the visible and the sensuous (sichbaren und sinnlichen) to communicate the developments of the inner life. in classical art, the visible form acts as a symbol participating as fully as possible in the ontological meaning of absolute spirit. but the visible form of romantic art acts more as a sign, communicating the artistic happenings of subjective life without being the main center of interest. here hegel is attempting to show that the significance of the visible sensuous is not due to its natural sensuous qualities but comes instead from the fact that imagination subjects the natural qualities to its own subjective purposes and thus transforms these material qualities of the medium into art.
one particular text on the understanding of romantic art deserves our attention here“we find…as the termination of romantic art, the contingency of the exterior condition and internal life, and a falling asunder of the two aspects, by reason of which art commits an act of suicide.”[ix] one interpretation of this text is that hegel is concluding the dissolution of romantic art on the ground of the dissolution of the sensuous and the subjective in this stage of art. from this, the advocates of the death of art interpretation of hegel assume that hegel intends the death of art. unfortunately, this interpretation is based on a faulty translation of the phrase “kunst selbst sich aufhebt,” into the english “art commits an act of suicide” may have contributed to the death of art interpretation of hegel’s aesthetics, especially among english speaking readers.[x] however, in so far as i can determine, hegel never actually used the phrase, “the death of art.” the translator
ignores tha fact that aufheben is one of hegel’s most enigmatic terms. literally it means to raise up something; however as a philosophical notion it can also mean “cancel,” “dissolve,” or “preserve”. the dissolution in romantic art is more akin to the modern cinematic principles of dissolve. in a film, to dissolve is to fade out one shot or scene while simultaneously fading in the next, overlapping the two in the process. the analogous process of “dissolve” in romantic art recognizes that it is necessary, or at least desireable to recognize alternative, possibly more complete, forms of truth than art can supply. art, together with religion and philosophy remain viable as alternative means of
understanding truth. it is not necessary to argue that one replaces the other or forces the end of the other. at least this is my reading of the insights that hegel has to offer in this subject.
for those interested in poetry, which for hegel is interpreted broadly to include a range of literary texts including texts written for the the theater, hegel argues that poetry as one of the romantic arts is the most successful of the arts both in its representational powers and in accommodating its sensuous forms to the aims of inner subjectivity. the latter of these is of special interest for our discussion of the death of art.[xi] at times hegel expresses the argument for the superiority of poetry negatively, as for example, when he implies that poetry dispenses with its sensuous materials. however, again, he reminds us that sensuous form remains essential for the communication of inner activities of the imagination in the human mind as is the case with the other arts. poetry thus understood acts as a sign to transmit the qualities of emotion and ideas shaped by the imagination.[xii] the communication through poetry remains possible because sensuous form is transformed and elevated through the activity of the imagination. it is not insignificant to hegel’s argument for poetry to note that the “raw material” of the sensuous form of poetry, unlike other art forms up to his time with the possible exception of music, is already a product of mind and requires less “working over” than the sensuous forms in architecture or painting. however, it remains that language is both thought and human speech or written inscription and thus poetry too retains a sensuous form. unlike the sensuous materials used in sculpture or painting, language is an invention of the human mind . as such it too requires the continued reliance on its sensuous form and does not support the notion that romantic art entails the death of art.
my conclusion based on the above considerations is that hegel did not intend the death of art, or the end of art . he uses the principle of dialectic to show the limits of art for communicating certain truths better communicated through the theoretical means available to philosophy. the texts that allegedly support the death of art thesis are less puzzling when the interpreter is mindful of their respective purposes of (1) justifying philosophy of art; (2) defining art’s place and limits in relation to other modes of cognition; (3) contrasting and comparing the different forms of art. beyond these considerations, hegel is very clear in stating that man as a thinking consciousness requires art. “the universal need for art…is man’s rational need to lift the inner and outer world into his spiritual consiciousness as an object” through which he is able to exercise spiritual freedom.[xiii] further evidence for this conclusion is found in his philosophy of history which outlines in part the workings of objective spirit in history where hegel acknowledges that works of art are essential vehicles for expressing community and national values. [xiv]
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the state of the dialectic of history in hegel’s time in history was such that he viewed philosophy as the highest mode for disclosing spirit. however, it is seldom noted that hegel’s dialectic is reversible and non-linear, allowing for art to replace philosophy as a more adequate disclosure of spirit in human understanding and in human affairs at a later point in history. when philosophy focuses on small linguistic puzzles, as it did in certain forms of analytic philosophy, and ignores the key concerns for the meaning of human existence, there is opportunity for art to assume a greater importance. is this what has happened in the twentieth century? it is not certain where we are today on this matter, as neither artists nor philosophers can be counted on for special insights into matters of truth or understanding. at best they may contribute in small ways to the on-going striving for understanding in a conceptual field of pluralistic opportunities, that is, to search for understanding of self and of the worlds in which selves exist.
ii arthur danto’s ideas concerning the end of art
among contemporary philosophers of note, arthur danto acknowledges an unabashed debt to hegel’ lectures on aesthetics in his own quest to connect the history of art to the contemporary developments in art. danto first began to speak of the end of art in 1984 in an essay published in a collection of essay by various authors titled the death of art ed. beryl lang. he has repeatedly returned to this theme is a series of essays in his subsequent writings found in the state of the arts (1987), embodied meanings (1994), after the end of art (1997), the madonna of the future (2000), the philosophical disenfranchisement of art (2005) and elsewhere. ( as i have noted, the expression “death of art” was initially a reference to a misleading interpretation of hegel. in his essay, “art after the end of art,” in embodied meanings (1994), danto disavows his earlier association with the notion of “the death of art,” explaining instead that he intended instead to focus on the end of art as a philosophical matter. there seems to be no question, however, that danto’s interest in this topic derives from hegel’s discussion of the end art in the lectures on aesthetics. danto’s effort to dissociate himself from the death of art, as a misleading phrase is consistent with my earlier analysis showing that hegel did not intend the death of art.
danto’s approach to the end of art addresses, among other concerns, these related issues: the history of art, how to distinguish art from non-art, and the relation of art and philosophy. he understands the history of art as a narrative of related developments in a particular time period and focused on the evolution of progress in mimesis, or rendering the world in images of art. the end of the history of art, came with modern art. modern art is characterized as a state in which art became conscious of itself as an object with a new set of relationships distinguished in part by abstraction as compared to mimesis as a defining characteristic of prior art history. key elements calling for a change in the way art and art history art to be understood came with duchamp’s readymades (manufactured objects --shovel and urninal--appropriated and offered as art) early in the twentieth century and warhol’s brillo boxe (objects perceptually indistinguishable from manufactured brillo boxes) in the 1960s helped erase the boundaries between art and non-art as it had been understood in art history. none of these developments in art existed, of course during hegel’s time.
nevertheless, danto’s solution, based on his understanding of hegel’s aesthetics, proposed an end to art history as a particular historical phenomenon.[xv] his strategy was motivated in part by his view of “the dismal state of the art world” in 1984, and by his inability to reconcile the past developments in art with the radical pluralism that emerged as post-historical or post-modern art. this did not mean that no more art would be produced, just as artists did not cease making art when philosophy superceded art in hegel’s schema with respect to its ability to deal with matters calling for different cognitive capabilities. namely, philosophy brought to understanding theoretical reasoning which art did not offer. danto at first seems to suggest that art turns into philosophy when, as modern art, it becomes self-conscious and reflects on its own meaning. but he clarifies that he does not mean that art literally becomes philosophy, only that by calling attention to the shift from mimesis to abstraction and conceptual art it becomes a part of its own understanding. again, danto follows hegel’s suggestion concerning the relation of art and philosophy. for example, in a historical moment of hegel’s scheme, when philosophy becomes the fullest disclosure of spirit, the best art might be expressed as philosophy of art. the difference was that philosophy of art would be expected to provide a theoretical account of what took place in the objective history of art and to position art in a larger ontological framework.
the main problems facing danto are two fold: first, how to distinguish art from non-art in an age of radical pluralism of the post-historical era, and second how to formulate a philosophical theory of art that will account for all of art past, present, and future. to accomplish the first aim, he posits history as a particular period in which art is produced with a common theme of mimetic art, distinct from the modern art of the twentieth century, and even more alien to the pluralism of contemporary art where it seems that anything can be considered art. with respect to the second aim, danto seems to emerge as an avowed essentialist searching for the equivalent of hegel’s universal spirit,, which would serve to underlies the changes in history, and serve as a key to understanding every instance of art, whether in pre-history, history, or the post-historical era of art. this part of his inquiry leads danto to posit a theory of deep interpretation which would be able to adjudicates among the incommensurables of art-making that occur beneath a phenomenology of stylistic changes. it is at the level of the deep interpretation that it is possible to discern what is, and what is not to be valued as art. at this point, danto suggests the possibility of a universal definition of art not subject to historical overthrow, but a definition that allows for openness with respect to particular instances of art. the answer must come from philosophy rather than art history. (ideally, it seems, danto’s aim would be best served by a definition with necessary and sufficient conditions for identifying instances of works of art.) clearly, the proclamations of the art world will
not be sufficient to tell us what is and is not art. nor will the precedents from the age
of art history be able to help with radically new creations of the artists of the future.
how useful is danto’s contribution? like hegel in his time, danto offers a very rich and thoughtful examination of the state of art in our times and attempts to come to grips with
the pluralism that exists now and in the past while preserving art history and the necessity of recognizing the continuation of art. of all aestheticians working today, he is among the most well informed concerning art past and present. his writings as critic and philosopher are as stimulating to read and contemplate as any art of today.
if one is to approach art from the perspective of ontology and history, hegel and danto offer a rich and fruitful exploration. my main problem with danto’s end of art thesis, is that it operates on a theory of history which is counter intuitive and may lead to confusion for both philosophically and artistically grounded readers, as well as for other readers. it seems arbitrary to limit the history of art to a particular time period, when art has been a part of virtually all known civilizations and continues at a lively pace in our own time. it is not sufficient to offset this concern by appeal to a theory of aesthetics or a philosophy of art that ignores this fact in order to come up with a tidier account of art or aesthetics. philosophy must be clarifying and not merely contribute to further intellectual confusion. part of the difficulty derives from the source of danto’s thesis as it is based on hegel writings. hegel’s philosophy of art is extremely rich and complex. there is often room for multiple interpretations. focus on a particular text, apart from the whole, can easily lead the reader into misunderstandings. and even with a grasp of the whole, the texts can still remain puzzling, seemingly if not actually contradictory.
i am not convinced that hegel’s view entails the end of history any more than it does the end of art. similarly danto’s understanding of the end of art, as well as the end of history remains unconvincing. on the other hand, i do not find danto’s view on the subject without merit. rather, he continues to work at the problems of understanding the at times perplexing state of new developments in art and advances, or alters his views as his thinking evolves over the years as he returns again and again to the theme of the end of art. in this respect he is making a worthy contribution to the problem of understanding the complexities of art as it was and continues to be. at the same time, danto’s effort to locate a concept sufficiently powerful to embrace the broadest range of possibilities conceivable by human creativity, and to serve as an umbrella for linking all the objects is that are proposed as art is a worthy, if challenging task. not surprisingly he did not yet succeed in identifying such a concept. yet, his approach strikes me as much more useful than settling too soon on a concept that excludes or limits the present and future possibilities of what can be considered art. there is still hope. history has not ended, art has not ended, and there is hope for philosophy as well so long as great minds
such as hegel’s and danto’s lend themselves to the task.
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[i] curtis l. carter, “a re-examination of the ‘death of art’ interpretation of hegel’s aesthetics,” warren e. steinkraus and kenneth i. schmitz, editors, art and logic in hegel’s philosophy new jersey: humanities press, sussex: harvester press, 1980), pp. 83-103.
[ii] sir malcom knox, “the puzzle of hegel’s aesthetic,” in art and logic in hegel’s philosophy, edited by warren e. steinkraus and kenneth i. schmitz. (p. 8. see also sir malcom knox, hegel’s lectures on aesthetics (oxford, oxford, england, 1975), pp. 11, 103.
[iii] jean hyppolite, genesis and structure of hegel’s phenomenology of spirit , translators cherniak and heckman, (evanston: northwestern university press, 1974), pp.. 64, 65, 597..
[iv] see michael mitias, “rejoinder,” in steinkraus and schmitz, art and logic in hegel’s philosophy, p. 82.
[v] sir t. m. knox, hegel’s aesthetics ( 1975), p. 56.
[vi] rüdiger bubner, “hegel’s aesthetics yesterday and today,” in steinkraus and schmitz, art and logic in hegel’s philosophy, p. 17.see bubner’s essay for a discussion of the followers of hegel on this matter, pp. 17-22.
[vii] t. m. knox, translator, hegel’s aesthetics, pp. 792-796.
[viii] knox,translator, hegel’s aesthetics, p. 795.
[ix] the german text is as follows: “dadurch erhalten wir als endpunkt des romantischen überhaupt die zufälligkeit des Āusseren wie des inneren und ein auseinanderfallen dieser seiten,durch welches die kunst selbst sich aufhebt und die norwendigkeit für das bewusstsein ziegt….”
[x] g.w.f. hegel, the philosophy of fine art, translator, osmatson, (london: g. bell & sons, 1920). knox’s translation published in 1975 served to correct such errors in the 1920 translation of osmatson.
[xi] knox, translator, hegel’s aesthetics, pp. 960, 966.
[xii] see curtis l. carter, hegel and whitehead on aesthetic symbols,” george r. lucas, editor, hegel and whitehead: contemporary perspectives on systematic philosophy (albany: state university of new york press, 1986), p. 248, 249.
[xiii] knox, translator, hegel’s aesthetics, pp. 32-35.
[xiv] g. w. f. hegel, lectures on the philosophy of world history, translator, h. b. nisbet, (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1975), pp. 56-58. see also hegel, encyclopedia, translator gustave emil mueller (new york:philosophical library, 1959) par. 458.
[xv] it should be noted that the term history is used in at least two different senses in hegel’s writings, first at “the history of the world,” and second as the intelleactual discipline that exists to interpret the world. the “history of the world” consists of the events in time through which spirit manifests itself in a people , or a state. history as an intellectual discipline consists of original history, reflective history, and philosophical history. the aim of original history is to present an interpretation of events based on personal observations and on participation. reflective history develops an overview of events according to the historian’s choice of framework; for example, he may choose among universal, pragmatic, or criticl frameworks. philosophical history explores the role of spirit as the director of events in world history; it incorporates the sum total of all possible perspectives. see george dennis o’brien, hegel on reason and history (chicago and london: university of chicago press, 1975), p. 122. see also curtis l. carter, “comment,” in history and systems: hegel’s philosophy of history, robert perkins, editor, (albany: state university of new york press, 1984), pp. 186, 187.
