ivan eland is director of defense policy studies at the cato institute and authorof putting defense back into u.s.defense policy ：rethinking u.s.security in the postcold war world.
published by the cato institute
policy analysis is a regular series evaluating government policies and offeringproposals fro reform.
executive summary
the ongoing modernization of the chinese military poses less of a threat tothe united states than recent studies by the pentagon and a congressionally mandatedcommission have posited.both studies exaggerate the strength of chinas militaryby focusing on the modest improvements of specific sectors rather than the still-antiquatedoverall state of chinese forces.the state of the chinese military and its mod-ernization must also be put in the context of u.s.interests in east asia and comparedwith the state and modernization of the u.s.military and other militaries in eastasia，especially the taiwanese military.viewed in that context，chinas militarymodernization does not look especially threatening.
although not officially calling its policy in east asia containment ，the unitedstates has ringed china with formal and informal alliances and a forward militarypresence.with such an extended defense perimeter ，the united states considersas a threat to its interests any natural attempt by chinaa rising power with a growingeconomyto gain more control of its external environment by increasing defense spending.if u.s.policymakers would take a more restrained view of americas vital interestsin the region ，the measured chinese military buildup would not appear so threatening.conversely，u.s.policy may appear threatening to china.even the pentagon admitsthat china accelerated hikes in defense spending after the united states attackedyugoslavia over the kosovo issue in 1999.
the united states still spends about 10times what china does on national defense$400bil-lion versus roughly $40billion per yearand is modernizing its forces muchfaster.in addition ，much of the increase in chinas official defense spending issoaked up by expenses not related to acquiring new weapons.thus，chinas spendingon new armaments is equivalent to that of a nation that spends only $10billionto $20billion per year on defense.in contrast ，the united states spends wellover $100billion per year to acquire new weapons.
even without u.s.assistance，taiwans mod-ern military could probably dissuadechina from attacking.taiwan does not have to be able to win a conflict ；it needsonly to make the costs of any attack unacceptable to china.the informal u.s.securityguarantee is unneeded.
introduction
both the pentagon and a congressionally mandated commission recently issuedstud-ies on the chinese military that overstated the threat to the united statesposed by that force.the pessimism of both studies was understandable.
the department of defenses studytheannual report on the military power of thepeoples republic of china1was issued by a federal bureaucracy that has an inherentconflict of interest in developing assessments of foreign military threats.becausethe department that is creating the threat assessments is the same one that is lobbyingcongress for money for weapons，personnel ，fuel ，and training to combat threats，its threat projections tend to be inflated.because china ，with an economy thatis seemingly growing rapidly，is the ris-ing great power on the horizon that shouldshape the future posture of american con-ventional forces（the brushfire wars neededto combat terrorism are likely to require only limited forces ），the threat fromchinas armed forces is critical for bringing addition-al money into the pentagon.the u.s.-china security review commissions workthe national security implicationsof the economic relationship between the united states and chinadrew at least partiallyon the pentagons effort and was written by anti-china hawks and those with a desireto restrict commerce with china.2
in contrast ，this paper attempts to place the modernizing chinese militaryin the con-text of a more balanced and limited view of u.s.strategic interestsin east asia.in addi-tion ，when the distorting perspectives of both studiesare removedthat is，their focus on recent improvements in chinese military capabilitiesrather than on the overall state of the chinese militarythe threat from the chinesearmed forces is shown to be modest.the bone-crushing dominance of the u.s.mil-itary remains intact.in fact ，the chinese mili-tary does not look all that impressivewhen compared even to the taiwanese armed forces.
putting the modernizing chinese military in context
frequently，improvements in the chinese military are reported in the worldpress with-out any attention to context.that is ，those flows are highlightedbut the stockthe overall state of the chinese militaryis ignored.the state of thechinese military and how rapidly it is likely to improve will be examined in thesecond half of this paper.but first，additional context is needed.pockets ofthe chinese military are now modernizing more rapidly than in the past，but comparedto what ？both the moderniza-tion and the actual state of the chinese mili-tarymust be compared with those of the u.s.military and other militaries in the eastasian region（especially taiwans armed forces ）。WWw.11665.coMin addition，the geopoliticaland strategic environment in which chinese mil-itary modernization is occurringneeds to be examined.western students of the chinese military often speak abstractlyabout when growing chinese military power will adverse-ly affect u.s.interests.it is very important to concretely define such interests because the wider the definition，the more likely even small increments of additional chinese mili-tary power willthreaten them.
u.s.interests in east asiaeven before president bushs expansive new national security strategy was published，the united states perceived that it had a vital interest in maintaining in eastasia a contin-uous military presence that was deployed far forward.despite theend of the cold war ，the united states has maintained cold warera alliances thatencircle china；indeed ，it has actually strengthened them.the united stateshas formal alliances with japan ，south korea，thailand ，the philippines，andaustralia.in addition，the united states has an informal alliance with taiwanchinasarch enemyand a friendly strategic relation-ship with singapore and new zealand.in the postcold war era ，as the military threat to east asia decreased，the unitedstates strengthened its alliance with japan by gar-nering a japanese commitmentto provide logistical support to the united states during any war in the theater.the bush administra-tion came into office with an even stronger predilection toenhance security alliances（especially the one with japan ）than its pre-decessor.3
also，using the war on terrorism as part of its rationale，the bush administrationhas expanded u.s.military presence in the areas surrounding china.citing the needto fight the war on terrorism ，the united states sent special forces to fightabu sayafa tiny group of bandits with only a tangential con-nection to the al-qaedaterrorist movement in order to strengthen the u.s.security rela-tionship withthe government of the philippines.that security relationship had been diminishedwhen the philippine gov-ernment ejected the u.s.military from its bases in theearly 1990s.during the war against terrorism in afghanistan，the united statesestablished a temporary military presence on bases in central asian nations on chinaswestern border.given the bush administrations use of the war on terrorism as acover for deploying troops to georgia and the philippines and the history of theu.s.military presence in japan ，germany，and south korea ，the u.s.militarypresence in those central asian nations will likely become permanent.
before the september 11，2001，terrorist attacks and the ensuing war inafghanistan slowed the process，the administration was seeking better relationswith india so as to use that country as a counterweight to a ris-ing china.finally，the war on terrorism has fostered a newly cooperative u.s.-russian relationship ，thus completing the encir-clement of china.moreover ，the pentagon is increasingthe number of u.s.warships in the pacific region.
of course ，the u.s.government does not admit to a policy of containing china，as it did with the soviet union during the cold war.but in asia the ring of u.s.-ledalliances （formal and informal ），a forward u.s.mili-tary presence ，and closeramerican relation-ships with great powers capable of acting to balance againsta rising china constitute a de facto containment policy.such a policy is unwarrantedby the current low threat posed by china and may actually increase the threat thatit is designed to contain.
even the dod admits that the chinese are recognizing and reacting to u.s.policy：chinas leaders have asserted that the united states seeks to maintain a dominantgeostrategic position by containing the growth of chinese power ，ultimately dividingand westernizing china....beijing has interpreted the strengthening u.s.-japansecurity alliance ，increased u.s.presence in the asia-pacific region ，and effortsto expand nato as manifestations of washingtons strategy.4
the dod report continues：
chinese analyses indicate a con-cern that beijing would have difficul-ty managingpotential u.s.military intervention in crises in the taiwan strait or the southchina sea.there are even indications of a concern that the united states mightintervene in chinas internal disputes with ethnic tibetan or muslim minorities.chinese concerns about u.s.inter-vention likely have been reinforced by theirperceptions of u.s.response to the 19951996taiwan strait crises ，operation alliedforce in kosovo ，and more recent u.s.-led military operations to combat inter-national terrorism....following operation allied force in 1999，beijing seriouslyconsidered upgrading the priority attached to military modernization.while thesenior leadership has since reaffirmed its stress on economic growth and development，it never-theless agreed to provide significant additional resources and fundingto support accelerated military mod-ernization.5
and the bush administration recently issued a national security strategy thatshows that chinese perceptions are largely correct.the new security strategy aimsat ensuring u.s.primacythat is ，keeping the united states so powerful that othernations will be dissuaded from challenging itand preempt-ing （actually preventing）amorphous threats from nations that are developing or possess weapons of mass destruction.6clearly，the portion of the white houses security strategy concerned with primacy is aimedat china，the rising great power that administration offi-cials think is mostlikely to challenge the united states at some time in the future.despite the grandiosenature of the strategy，however ，the administration will probably not （one hopes）apply the preemption part of it to chinaa nation possessing 20long-range nuclearmissiles that can hit the united states.in short ，the de facto containment policywill probably continue to be followed.
the extended defense perimeter that the united states continues to maintainin east asia to carry out that containment policy shows a failure to recognize chinassecurity concerns.although china remains an authoritarian state（it is no longera totalitar-ian state because the government no longer has total control over theeconomic sphere ，and the average chinese citizen is probably more free economicallyand politically than at any time since the communist government took power in 1949），conflict might be avoid-ed if some understanding of the calculus of a potentialadversary were shown.if a foreign nation had ringed the united states with alliances，friendships with potential adver-saries，and an increasing military presence，the united states would feel very threat-enedas was the case ，for example，whenthe soviets attempted to place nuclear missiles in nearby cuba during the 1960s.
the united states fears any attempt by china to increase its influence in eastor southeast asia.yet，as the chinese economy grows and china becomes a greatpower ，it will naturally seek more control over its exter-nal environment.asmichael ohanlon and bates gill，both then at the brookings institution ，perceptivelynoted ，most of chinas ambitions are not global and are no longer ideological；they are territorial and confined to exerting more regional influence over the islandsand waterways to the south and southeast of its borders.7the united states couldaccommodate such limited ambitions as long as they did not snowball an unlikelyscenariointo a conflict that drastically altered the power balance in east asia.china has given no indication that it would like to make an attempt at imperialconquest of east asia.
in the past ，wars occurred when an estab-lished power refused to acknowledgethe great power status of a rising nationfor example，britains refusal to acknowledgethe kaisers germany in the late 1800s and early 1900s.the united states shouldnot make the same mistake with a rising china.china should be allowed，as allgreat powers do ，to develop a sphere of influence in its own regionthat is，eastasia.within limits ，an expanded sphere of chinese influence should not threatenu.s.vital interests，if defined less grandiosely than at present.unfortunately，the united states regards even the smallest change in the status quo in east asia（unless the change expands the already overextended u.s.defense perimeter ）
with suspicion.the united states does have a vital interest in ensuring a diffusionof power in east asia so that no hegemonic great power like imperial japan in the1930sarises.but，unlike the situation before world war ii，when china was weakand the french and british colonial powers were spread too thin ，centers of powerin east asia other than the united states exist to balance a rising china.japan，alone or in combination with south korea，taiwan ，australia ，and the associationof southeast asian nations，could balance against china.
the united states ，instead of maintaining cold warera alliances and a forwardmilitary pres-ence in the region ，should gradually withdraw its forces from eastasia and allow those nations to be the first line of defense against china.currently，those nations fail to spend enough on their security because the united states spendshuge amounts on its military and is willing to subsidize their security for them（the effects of this ill-advised policy in perpetu-ating taiwans insufficientdefense spending are discussed below）。
only if the balance of power in east asia broke down with the advent of an aggressivehegemonic power should the united states intervene militarily in the affairs ofthe region.that policy would be called a bal-ancer-of-last-resort strategy.sucha strategy would minimize the danger of a confronta-tion with china.
