chinese military modernization and its implications for taiwan

　　chinas economy is now four times the size of taiwans（$1.2trillion versus about$300billion）35and is growing faster （if you believe the official chinese governmentdata，which some analysts find suspect）。that eco-nomic disparity could，atleast theoretically ，be turned into a military disparity.but according to thepentagon，taiwans strategy is to enhance key aspects of its military capa-bilitiescounterblockadeoperations，air superiority over the taiwan strait ，and defense against amphibiousand aerial assault on the islandand buy time for posi-tive political changes tooccur in china that will ease tensions with taiwan.36the taiwanese certainly coulddo more than they currently do to ensure their security.defense expenditures haveactually been declin-ing as a percentage of taiwanese government spending.thetaiwanese fail to do more to enhance their own defenses because they believe thatthe united states will come to their aid if a crisis occurs with china.althoughu.s.policy is ambiguous on that point，president bush made it less ambiguous bysaying the united states would do whatever it took to defend taiwan ，and，in1996，president clinton sent two u.s.aircraft carriers into the taiwan straitafter the chinese splashed missiles there to intimidate taiwan.

　　president bushs pledge to do whatever it takes to defend taiwan is dubious.the security of taiwan has never been vital to the united states，and dueling witha nuclear-armed power in any crisis over the small island would be ill-advised.in any conflict between china and the united states over the island ，escalationto nuclear war is a pos-sibility.although the united states possesses thousandsof nuclear warheads that could hit china and the chinese have only about 20warheadsthat can reach the united states，china cares much more about taiwan than does theunited states and could even be irrational about the issue.

　　during the 1996crisis in the taiwan strait ，after the united states deployedtwo aircraft carriers near taiwan ，a chinese official told chas freeman ，a formeru.s.diplomat ，that the chinese were prepared to use nuclear weapons against theu.s.west coast if the united states intervened on behalf of taiwan.37although comingto the defense of a fellow democracy against an authoritarian chinese regime hasemotional appeal，u.s.policymakers have to ask themselves whether they are willingto trade los angeles to save taipei.the answer should be a resounding no.the unitedstates should sell taiwan the arms it needs for self-defense but should not guar-antee its security.besides ，taiwans security is not as hopeless without u.s.assistance as many analysts and press articles make it seem.hostile behavior towardtaiwan could dis-turb chinas increasing economic linkage with the rest of the worldespeciallygrowing com-mercial links with taiwan.because chinas highest priority is economicgrowth，the dis-ruption of such economic relationships is a dis-incentive foraggressive chinese actions vis——vis taiwan.any attack short of invasion（usingmissiles or instituting a naval blockade）would likely harm the taiwanese economyand dis-rupt chinese trade and financial contacts with taiwan and other developednations without getting china what it most wantscontrol of taiwan.an amphibiousinvasionin the unlikely event that it succeededwould provide such control but wouldcause even greater dis-ruption in chinas commercial links to devel-oped nations.

　　amphibious assault

　　an amphibious assault on taiwan is the least likely chinese military optionbecause of its low probability of success.even with-out u.s.assistance ，thetaiwanese have the advantage of defending an island.an amphibious assaultthat is，attacking over water and landing against defended posi-tionsis one of the hardestand most risky military operations to execute.in the normandy invasion of 1944，the allies had strategic surprise ，air and naval supremacy，crushing naval gunfiresupport ，and a ground force coming ashore that was vastly superior in numbersto that of the germans.yet even with all those advantages，the allies had somedifficulty establishing beachheads.in any amphibious assault on taiwan ，chinawould be unlikely to have strategic surprise，air or naval supremacy（taiwaneseair and naval forces are currently superior to those of the chinese ），38or sufficientnaval gunfire support ，and its landing force would be dwarfed by the taiwanesearmy and reserves.also ，china has insufficient amphibious forces ，dedicatedamphibious ships to carry them to taiwans shores，and naval air defense to protectan amphibious flotilla from taiwans superior air force.according to the study byswaine and mulvenon of rand ，mainland china will likely remain unable to undertakesuch massive attack over the medium-term，and perhaps，over the long-term as well.39inaddition，probably for the next two decades，chinas lack of an integrated airdefense system could leave its homeland open to retaliatory attacks by the taiwaneseair force ，which could deter a chinese attack on taiwan in the first place.inthe long term ，even if china overcomes those deficiencies and taiwan lags behindchina in military improvements，the taiwanese could use a porcupine strategy againsta superior foe.that is ，the taiwanese armed forces would not have to be strongenough to win a war with the chinese mili-tary ；they would only have to be ableto inflict enough damage to raise the cost of a chinese invasion significantly.in this regard，taiwan may be helped by modern technology.sea mines ，precision-guidedmunitions （includ-ing anti-ship cruise missiles ），and satellite reconnaissance，which makes surprise diffi-cult，may render any amphibious assault an exceptionallybloody affair.in fact，some defense analysts believe that such technology hasmade large-scale amphibious assaults a thing of the past.

　　naval blockade

　　although more likely than an amphibious invasion of taiwan，a naval blockadeusing chinese submarines and surface ships would face some of the same problemsas an amphibious flotilla.the poor air defenses on chinese surface ships wouldrender them vulnerable to attack by superior taiwanese air power.in addition ，chinese naval com-mand and control is probably inadequate to manage a naval quarantine.although china has more submarines and surface warships in its navy than does taiwan，the taiwanese navy has superior surveillance and anti-sub-marine and anti-surfacewarfare capabilities.currently ，the chinese might very well be able to disrupttaiwans commerce to a lim-ited extent with their modest mine-laying capabilityand submarine attacks （sub-marines are less susceptible than surface ves-selsto attack from the air），but even estab-lishing a partial blockade of certainports would be difficult.by 2025，swaine and mulvenon predict that china coulddeny the use of the sea and air out to 500nautical miles from chinas coastlineand attempt a naval blockade within 200nautical miles of that coastline.40so evenin 2025，china might not be able to enforce a complete naval quarantine of taiwan.

　　intimidation with missile launches or actual attacks

　　in 1996china tried to intimidate taiwan with missile tests in the taiwan straitduring chinese military exercises at the time of the taiwanese presidential elections.those actions had the opposite effect of that intendedthe election outcome was notwhat the chinese government had desired.actual missile attacks on taiwan for thepur-pose of terrorizing the taiwanese population would probably cause an even greaterback-lash against china in taiwan and the inter-national community and could triggerretal-iatory raids on the mainland by the superior taiwanese air force.neitherthe accuracy nor the numbers of chinese missiles now permit them to have a significanteffect when used against taiwanese military targets.as chinese missiles becomemore numerous and accurate，such missile attacks would become more militarily consequential.but passive defense measures could reduce signif-icantly the effectiveness of chinesemissile attacks on military targets.

　　rather than provide an informal security guarantee for taiwan ，the unitedstates should sell taiwan the arms to defend itself.president bush has authorizedthe sale of a greater number of weapon systems to taiwan than president clintonapproved.but taiwan has been slow to come up with the money to buy many of them.taiwan needs to do more for its own defense but will not if the united states continuesto informally guarantee taiwans security.implications for the united states：chinasrelations with other neighbors according to christopher a.mcnally and charles e.morrison，authors of asia pacific security outlook 2002，china has steadily improvedrelations with countries sharing its land borders ，but the chinese still haveissues with their maritime neighbors.in 2001the leaders of china，russia ，kazakhstan，uzbekistan，tajikistan ，and the kyrgyz republic created the shanghai cooperationorganization that was designed to increase cooperation in regional security ，economicrelations ，culture，science，education，and environmental protection.in addition，

　　china signed the treaty of good-neighborliness and friendly cooperation withrussia，which pledged，among other things ，that the two nations would not useforce in disputes and would not target mis-siles at each other.chinas relationswith for-mer foesindia and vietnamhave warmed with growing economic relations andhigh-level visits.41in general ，such arrangements contribute to the securityof the regions involved.the military cooperation between china and russia bearswatching，but it is only exacerbated by the unstated u.s.policy of containingchina with encircling alliances and a continuing forward military presence in eastasia.

　　according to james holt ，an analyst for the world policy institute，chinasmilitary is qualitatively inferior to that of russia，india，vietnam ，and taiwanand would lose any war against any of those nations.in particular，since the 1960sindia has more than doubled the size of its military and modernized its armed forcesto a greater extent than china.in addition ，holt argues that for the last 30years chinas military power has also been declining vis ——vis that of the unitedstates，taiwan ，japan ，and south korea.holt maintains that unless china atleast doubles real military spending，its rate of weapons purchases in relationto the size of its armed forces is so low that its military will continue to declinerela-tive to those of the united states，taiwan ，india ，japan，and south korea.42thisneed is caused by the low percentage of chinese defense expenditures that is currentlyallocat-ed to the acquisition of weapons.

　　in contrast to chinas improving relations with its neighbors on land，its disputewith a maritime neighbor，the philippines，over islands in the south china seacontinues.but the dispute is contained because both nations want to avoid spillovereffects into their bilat-eral political and economic relationships ，accordingto mcnally and morrison.43china and the association of southeast asian nations recentlysigned an agreement to man-age such territorial disputes in the south china sea.in any event，according to dod ，the chinese navy is inferior to other regionalnavies in most technologies ，especially surveil-lance；air defense；and command，control ，communications，computers，and intelligence （c4i ）。wWw.11665.COM44therefore ，those naviesalone or in concertshould be able to contain any chinese adventurism，should negotiations fail.in the end，however，who owns the small island chainsin the south china sea，or the resources under the waters surrounding them ，isnot important to the security of the united states.the united states should notinterfere in efforts to negotiate a peaceful solution to the problem.

　　conclusion

　　although many alarmist articles in the press have trumpeted improvements inthe chinese military，those enhancements are pockets of modernization in a largelyanti-quated force.chinas military modernization is more rapid than before butis not a massive soviet-style military buildup.as the chinese economy grows andchina becomes a great power ，the united states should accept that it，like othergreat powers，will want more influence over its region.if kept within bounds，that increased sphere of influence should not threaten vital u.s.interests.butthe united states ，especially under the bush administrations new expansive nationalsecurity strategy of primacy and preemption ，sees any change in the status quoin east asia as a threat to its expansive list of vital interests.if the unitedstates unnecessarily maintains，or even continues to expand，its defense perimeterto surround and contain china ，the rising power and the status quo powerboth armedwith nuclear weaponsmay come into needless conflict.the united states must takea less grandiose view of its vital interests，redraw its defense perimeter ，abrogateits cold warera alliances （including the informal alliance with nonstrategic taiwan），and reverse its military buildup.currently ，the united states is unnec-essarilymodernizing its armed forces faster than is china ，which is starting from an extremelylow level of military modernity.china，whose highest priority is economic development，is now reacting to the expansion of the u.s.defense perimeter and the u.s.mili-tary buildup by increasing its own defense bud-get more rapidly.thus，u.s.policymay be engendering the threat it most fears.

　　notes

　　1.u.s.department of defense ，annual report on the military power of thepeoples republic of china ：report to congress pursuant to the fy2000national defenseauthorization act ，2002.although the report was required by congress in an fy2000law ，dod submitted it in 2002.subsequently cited as dod，military power of theprc.

　　2.china security review commission ，report to congress of the u.s.-chinareview commissionthe national security implications of the economic relationshipbetween the united states and china ，july 2002，appendix 2，pp.16.membersof the com-mission included chairman richard damato，a former foreign policy counselfor sen.robert byrd（d-w.va.）；vice chairman michael ledeen ，from the hawkishamerican enterprise institute ；george becker ，former president of the unitedsteelworkers of america ；stephen bryen，former chief of the pentagons officewith jurisdiction over controls on technology exports ；patrick mulloy ，formerhead of the commerce departments office responsible for ensuring for-eign compliancewith trade agreements ；william reinsch，former head of the commerce departmentsoffice to administer and enforce export control policies and former legislativeassistant to sen.john rockefeller（d-w.va.）；roger robinson jr.，senior staffmember at the national security council during the reagan administration；arthurwaldron ，director of asian studies at the american enterprise institute ；michaelwessel，former staff member in the office of richard gephardt（d-mo.）；and larrywortzel ，director of the asian studies center at the hawkish heritage foundation.

　　3.christopher a.mcnally and charles e.morrison ，asia pacific security outlook2002（tokyo ：japan center for international exchange，2002），p.55.

　　4.dod，military power of the prc，p.8.

　　5.ibid.，p.9.

　　6.george w.bush ，the national security strategy of the united states ofamerica ，white house ，september 2002，pp.v，14，15.

　　7.bates gill and michael ohanlon ，chinas hollow military ，national interest，no.56（summer 1999）：1.

　　8.bush ，p.iv.

　　9.dod，military power of the prc，p.38.

　　10.david shambaugh ，remarks at the cato institutes policy forum，is chinasmilitary modernization a threat to the united states？

　　september 9，2002，/events/020909pf.html.

　　11.international institute for strategic studies ，the military balance：20022003（london：oxford university press，2002），p.298.

　　12.dod ，military power of the prc，p.38.emphasis added.

　　13.china security review commission，chap.9，p.2.

　　14.muthiah alagappa，military professionalism in asia ：ascendance of theold professionalism ，in military professionalism in asia：conceptual and empiricalperspectives，ed.muthiah alagappa（honolulu：east-west center ，2001），p.184.

　　15.gill and ohanlon，p.8.

　　16.international institute for strategic studies ，p.241.

　　17.china security review commission，chap.10，p.4.

　　18.gill and ohanlon，pp.3，8.

　　19.china security review commission，chap.9，p.4.

　　20.dod ，military power of the prc，p.15.

　　21.international institute for strategic studies ，pp.22，147.

　　22.dod ，military power of the prc，p.20.

　　23.for more on this point，see ivan eland ，tilting at windmills：postcoldwar military threats to u.s.security ，cato institute policy analysis no.332，february 8，1999，p.24.

　　24.shambaugh.

　　25.cited in gill and ohanlon ，p.4.

　　26.quoted in china less aggressive toward surveillance planes，washingtonpost，august 24，2002，p.a9.

　　27.cited in gill and ohanlon ，p.2.

　　28.ibid.，pp.2，8.

　　29.department of defense ，the security situation in the taiwan strait：reportto congress pursuant to the fy 99appropriations bill ，1999，p.2.

　　30.dod ，military power of the prc，pp.6，9.

　　31.dod ，thesecurity situation in the taiwan strait ，p.3.

　　32.dod ，military power of the prc，p.9.

　　33.international institute for strategic studies ，p.241.

　　34.remarks of ross h.munro of the center for security studies at the catoinstitutes policy forum ，is chinas military modernization a threat to the unitedstates？cato institute ，september 9，2002.

　　35.international institute for strategic studies ，pp.298，301.

　　36.dod ，thesecurity situation in the taiwan strait ，p.3.

　　37.richard bornstein and ross h.muro，the coming conflict with china （newyork：vintage books，1997），pp.15354.

　　38.michael swaine and james mulvenon ，taiwans foreign and defense policies：features and determinants（santa monica，calif.：rand ，2001），p.115.

　　39.ibid.，p.124.

　　40.swaine and mulvenon ，pp.11314，116.

　　41.mcnally and morrison，pp.5657，60.

　　42.james w.holt ，twenty theses on the chinese military and the china-taiwanmilitary balance，world policy institute ，april 18，2001，p.1，w.org/cmp

　　43.mcnally and morrison，p.57.

　　44.dod ，thesecurity situation in the taiwan strait ，p.8.