in the aftermath of chinese premier wen jiabao's december 8-10visit to washington，congress must take stock of the bush administration's concessions to china on thetaiwan issue and assess what the united states received in return for compromisingits commitment to taiwan's democracy.a cold-eyed assessment of the u.s.-china relationshipsince the beginning of the bush administration will dispel the policy myths thathave colored the u.s.perception of china's role in asia and suggest how best tomanage china in the coming decades.but dispelling the myths requires an understandingof why the early bush administration's china policy changed after september 11.
china's april 2001downing of an american aircraft in international airspaceand the subsequent two-week detention of the crew brought a temporary sense of realismto china policy that was buttressed by the incoming bush administration's judgmentthat china was becoming a serious challenge to many american interests in asia.
however ，in a post-september 11world ，the administration's preoccupationwith the war on terrorism ，iraq ，and especially north korea has led policymakersto downplay china's resistance and hostility to u.s.initiatives in asia and elsewhere.over the past year，u.s.officials have proclaimed themselves "absolutely delightedwith the state of our relations with the people's republic of china and the directionwe're going ，"1and those american china scholars long known for their sunny viewsof the people's republic of china （prc ）have added glowing commentaries of theirown.212
in september，secretary of state colin powell was only a shade less ebullientin his observation that "u.s.relations with china are the best they have been sincepresident nixon's first visit."not that relations were warm and fuzzy，he explained，but rather that "neither we nor the chinese leadership anymore believe that thereis anything inevitable about our relationship ——either inevitably bad or inevitablygood."3
in contrast to secretary powell's balanced assessment ，the general appreciationof america's post-9/11relationship with china is riddled with myths and misconceptions.indeed，even president george w.bush declared that china was a "partner in diplomacyworking to meet the dangers of the 21st century"4——certainly an overstatement.
a dispassionate review of china's foreign affairs ，trade，and national securitypolicies over the past two years reveals that china has usually opposed u.s.interests，sometimes remained neutral，but never cooperated in achieving american goals.inthe wake of premier wen's visit to washington ，the administration and congressshould reexamine their china policy and consider why their candid ，firm ，andsuccessful pre-9/11china policy has been abandoned in favor of a policy of conciliationand compromise that has yielded little beyond rhetoric.
specifically，the administration should：
reassessamerica's strategic interests in the western pacific with an eye tohow china fits in ，whether as a friend，a neutral，or ——as is so often thecase——an adversary.make democratic reform in china the top priority of america'schina policy.firmly adhere to america's 50-year-old policy of dismissing china'sclaims of sovereignty over taiwan.be publicly candid about china's behavior andavoid painting u.s.-china relations in undeservedly glowing terms such as "delighted"and "better than ever."hold china to a results-based standard rather than blandlyaccepting china's promises that its proliferation behavior，unfair trade policies，and aggressive military buildup will change in return for concrete concessions fromthe u.s.reconsider china's growing military threat to taiwan in the context ofsecretary powell's simple benchmark ：the differences between china and taiwan arefundamentally political.they cannot be solved by military means……an arms build-up，like those new missiles opposite taiwan ，only deepen tensions ，deepen suspicion.whether china chooses peace or coercion to resolve its differences with taiwan willtell us a great deal about the kind of re-lationship china seeks not only with itsneighbors ，but with us.5
thus far，china has chosen only coercion against taiwan.
many american policymakers，scholars ，and journalists view china not forwhat it is，but for what they hope it to be.promoting myths about china neitherhelps change the behavior of the chinese government nor serves american nationalinterests.in fact，it gives the chinese leave to perpetuate bad practices whileat the same time creating unrealistic expectations that will ultimately undermineu.s.policies.
at the outset ，it should be recognized that china ：
has stepped up threats of war against democratic taiwan ；has not been a "partner，"strategic or otherwise，in the war on terrorism；was not helpful during the iraqwar and is not supportive of u.s.goals in reconstructing the country ；fully supportsnorth korea in its tense nuclear negotiations with the u.s.；is the world's premierproliferator of dangerous materials ，precursors ，and equipment and technologiesrelating to weapons of mass destruction （wmd ）and their delivery systems ；neglects，and even willfully violates ，its world trade organization and bilateral tradecommitments ；continues its pattern of severe human rights abuses ；and is likelyto force another maritime confrontation with the u.s.in the south china sea.commonchina policy myths myth #1：china has helped the u.s.in the war on terrorism.
assessing the course of the u.s.-china relationship as the war on terrorismenters its third year ，it may be instructive to examine how china has or has notcooperated in meeting the challenge of global terrorism.
the september 11，2001，terrorist attacks on the u.s.stunned china，andon september 12，the chinese president conveyed his deepest sympathies to presidentbush.soon afterward，however，china hedged its support for the brewing war onterrorism with immediate words of caution that american military action should "respectthe united nations'charter and norms of international law."6china also incongruouslylinked "terrorism"with what beijing characterized as taiwan's "splittism"7andcalled for "reliable evidence"before it would countenance american military strikesagainst afghanistan.8
from the beginning，china lobbied u.n.security council members to put thebrakes on american action.in a telephone conversation on sep-tember 18，chinesepresident jiang zemin told british prime minister tony blair that u.n.approvaland "irrefutable evidence"were needed for china to back armed retaliation for theattacks on the u.s.in a similar call to french president jacques chirac beforechirac's trip to washington ，jiang cautioned that "under current circumstances，keeping sober-minded is especially needed ，and prudence should be exercised inhandling relevant issues."jiang's message to russian president vladimir putin wasthe same.9
after september 11，the official people's daily web site reportedly postedan article declaring that the united states brought the tragedy upon itself becauseof its hegemony.10chinese journalists visiting the u.s.at the time of the terroristattacks were reportedly expelled after cheering the news——a charge that a statedepartment spokesman pointedly refrained from denying.11
in the immediate post-attack period ，the u.s.hoped for chinese assistancein "the financial area"（to freeze terrorist assets and funding）and in "rescueefforts"（possibly including permission for damaged u.s.aircraft to land at chineseairports），two areas in which then chinese foreign minister tang jiaxuan indicatedon september 22that china was willing to cooperate.while china's state-owned financialinstitutions may not have been prime conduits for terrorist money ，beijing governshong kong's foreign affairs ，and a nod from beijing was surely necessary beforehong kong's government and banks could cooperate fully and transparently with u.s.counterparts.this was one of china's few useful contributions to the war effort.
other chinese gestures of assistance，however，failed to produce results.for example ，a u.s.-china "expert group"met in washington on september 25，2001，for "wide-ranging talks"on cooperation in the global anti-terrorism effort.whilethe state department characterized these talks as "serious and productive"becausethey "successfully identified areas of common interest，"there was little indicationthat the group managed to agree on anything other than the general statement thatfighting terrorism is a good thing.12
some analysts have claimed that china encouraged pakistan to cooperate withthe united states in the first months after september 11.the opposite is true.vice foreign minister wang yi ，china's top asia specialist，was dispatched toislamabad on september 22but was unable to reach any consensus with the pakistanisother than the vaguely worded statement ，"it can be said that china and pakistan'sposition on the fight against terrorism are in accord with each other."13
the strange lack of a joint statement following such an important diplomaticmove suggested that the vice minister's real purpose in islamabad was to reassurepakistan of its support against american pressure.14chinese troop movements thatsame day down the karakoram highway toward the mountainous areas around the pakistaniand afghan borders were obviously designed not to prevent afghan intruders——themountains separating china and afghanistan are over 20，000feet high and were controlledby anti-taliban forces——but instead to reassure pakistan of the proximity of chineseforces.15
beijing's diplomatic coolness toward u.s.plans to strike terrorist bases inafghanistan was grounded in fears of greater u.s.involvement in central asia ，a region that it saw as being within its own sphere of influence.heralding a splitin the chinese leadership on the nature of china's anti-terrorism cooperation withthe u.s.，the liberation army daily quoted chief of general staff fu quanyou aswarning the u.s.against using the war on terrorism to dominate global affairs："counter-terrorism should not be used to practice hegemony."16
in february 2003，a prominent chinese scholar wrote in one of china's mostrespected foreign affairs periodicals that "the united states uses the fight againstterrorism as an opportunity to pursue its hegemonic strategy and hegemonism is carriedout under the cover of antiterrorism."moreover ，he blamed american "hegemonism"on the incumbent administration ，noting that "the pursuers of hegemonism are justsome of the people in power in the united states."for this reason，he explained，"tactically ，china cannot be without any reservations when cooperating with theunited states in combating terrorism."17
this assessment explains why china's post-9/11middle eastern and central asiandiplomacy was not helpful in the war on terrorism either operationally or diplomatically.in april 2002，for example，chinese president jiang zemin visited libya and iranto stress his country's strong ties with those nations——just before vice presidenthu jintao visited washington.according to the iranian press，"jiang has now senta clear message to the american administration that he will not abide by u.s.rulesand that he is determined to pursue an independent foreign policy."by the timejiang left tehran ，the iranians believed that "iran and china have at their disposalall necessary potentials to turn into two strategic partners in the region"andwere confident that "the chinese will surely stay with us 'til the end."18
additionally，the week after vice president hu's visit to washington ，chinapressured its central asian "allies ，"kazakhstan and kyrgyzstan ，to back awayfrom their support of the u.s.19under pressure from beijing，the kazakhs scaledback offers of airspace and bases to american forces while the kyrgyz did not.
u.s.-china anti-terrorism cooperation has been a one-way street.fbi agentsare said to have trained their chinese counterparts in the intelligence exploitationof terrorist archives ，yet there is little indication that china has made anysubstantive contribution to anti-terrorist intelligence.in april 2002，admiraldennis blair，the u.s.commander in the pacific，told reporters that，"with othergovernments that we're operating with more closely，like the philippines or singaporeand malaysia，it's very detailed ，tactical information of the type you need totake action ，"adding that "i think we need to get to that level with beijing，and it's not quite there yet."20
in february 2003，state department coordinator for counter-terrorism j.coferblack led a u.s.delegation to beijing for the third session of u.s.-china anti-terrorismconsultations and the second consultation of the sino-u.s.financial counter-terrorismworking group.21while the state department was polite about china's stance in thewar on terrorism，the most black could say about china's cooperation was that "weare very pleased with our cooperation"and "we think it has great potential"22——a full 18months after 9/11.
all in all，china's diplomatic support in the war on terrorism has been marginalat best.the most that could be said is that china voted in support of both u.n.security council resolutions after the september 11attacks ，though it could hardlyhave avoided doing so.23in august 2003，china also committed to join the containersecurity initiative （csi ），which permits u.s.customs officials to pre-screencargo containers bound for the united states.but china had no choice ：two-thirdsof all containers headed to the united states come from china ，and the alternativeto chinese csi participation was delays of chinese ships entering u.s.ports.
in addition ，contrary to media reports，china has provided relatively littlesupport in rebuilding afghanistan ，and virtually none through the united nations.24meanwhile ，the chinese used "terrorism"as an excuse to jail and in some casesexecute uighurs （a turkic ethnic group ）in western china who oppose the progressivesinicization of their traditional homeland.
myth #2：china "stood aside"in the iraq war.
in mid-2002，china appeared to be supportive of u.s.efforts to get iraq toaccede to reconstituted united nations inspections for weapons of mass destruction.in late august 2002，during a visit by iraqi foreign minister naji sabri to beijing，the chinese extolled their long friendship with iraq，but also warned that iraqmust "strictly implement u.n.security council resolutions"in order to avoid "theemergence of a new complexity with the iraq issue."25reading between the lines ，beijing told baghdad that iraq had brought its problems on itself and that，whilechina did not "approve"of the use of force ，it would not oppose a security councilresolution authorizing such force.
