the purpose of this article is to investigate the main characteristics of thediplomatic policy of new china during the period of its formation and its historicalimplications.

　　i."leaning to one side"and the revolutionary nature of new china‘s diplomacy

　　the central committee of the communist party of china （cpc ）began to considernew china ‘s diplomatic policy around the end of 1948.the main diplomatic principlesformulated within approximately three months consisted of the following ：non-recognitionof imperialism and a bias towards the soviet union（later called "leaning to oneside"），"building a new stove"（i.e.，cooking one ’s meal in a new way ），and "cleaning up the house first，then inviting guests."in the light of the guidingprinciples and the problems to be resolved，all these "three principles showeda strong revolutionary commitment.

　　by "revolutionary commitment"we mean that they appeared under the guidanceof the theory of chinese revolution and were closely linked to the fundamental problemsto be resolved in the late phase of the chinese revolution.in this sense ，``leaningto one side"was the most representative.

　　the concept of leaning to one side had two meanings ——the guiding principleand development strategy for new china.firstly ，mao zedong ‘s motive in proposing"leaning to one side"was to answer the question of on which side china should standin an international configuration of states divided into two camps -the socialistcamp and the capitalist camp.at this level.，leaning to one side was both a guidingprinciple for the diplomatic strategy of new

　　china ，and a vivid description of its diplomatic pattern.alliance with thesoviet union and non-recognition of imperialist states were only specific manifestationsof this general pattern.

　　leaning to one side was a product of more than twenty years of revolution andwas put forward as a cardinal principle on the eve of victory.it is impossibleto interpret the formation of the principle of leaning to one side，or the inherentlimitations in the later readjustments made to new china‘s foreign policy，unlessthe understanding of the relations between the chinese revolution and world politicson the part of the cpc leadership are taken into consideration .

　　the great changes brought about by the end of world war i and the victory ofthe october revolution in russia established the international background for thechinese revolution led by the communists.lenin ‘s theory of imperialisrn，theoctober revolution，the lessons learnt from the failure of the 1911revolution ，and the experience and plight of the early cpc leaders were all incorporated intothe communists"knowledge of important matters such as international affairs andthe relationship between the chinese revolution and the world.in their view，"theworld capitalist and imperialist powers are in collaboration to exploit the proletariatand the oppressed nations throughout the world."the chinese revolution would prevailover imperialism "only if it

　　integrates itself into the world revolutionary trend of the oppressed nationsand is linked to the international proletarian revolutionary movement.""this isthe only road that will enable the chinese toiling masses to gain liberation fromimperialist oppression."1as testified by history，this knowledge gained in theearly stages influenced the strategies and tactics of the cpc in all later periods.

　　at the beginning of the anti-japanese national united front ，the cpc centralcommittee pointed out that "the chinese people are faced with the task of linkingchina ‘s anti-japanese national united front with the world peace front，"andchina "should work for joint opposition to japanese imperialism"with great britainand america.2in january 1940，against the background of deteriorating relationsbetween the soviet union on one side and america，great britain and france on theother ，and after the german invasion of poland and increasing conflict betweenthe guomindang and the cpc，mao zedong reemphasized in "on new democracy"that ，"the chinese revolution …forms part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution.""in the international situation of today，the’heroes‘in the colonies and semi-colonieseither line up on the imperialist front and become part of the forces of world counter-revolution，or they line up on the anti-imperialist front and become part of the forces of worldrevolution.they must do one or the other ，for there is no third choice."3maozedong meant that if there was a confrontation between the soviet union and thewestern nations the cpc leadership was bound to stand with moscow and adopt radicalmeasures in the domestic struggle .

　　at the end of 1941，moscow formed an alliance with washington and london againstfascism and the leadership of the cpc modified their views on the irreconcilabilitybetween international revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces.they believedthat the alliance had created a "new world order"in which important internationalproblems must be solved through "agreements between states headed by america，greatbritain and the soviet union."and domestic problems "must also be solved in accordancewith democratic principles"4within the overall pattern of cooperation among thethree world powers，the guomindang dared not engage in large-scale anti-communistactivities，and the cpc was also restrained from radical social revolution ."forsome time after the war the whole international situation will still be one in whichthe democratic forces cooperate and form a united front ，china will have to bea democratic republic before it enters socialism."5the cpc made adjustments toits domestic and foreign policies several times between the summer of 1942and theend of the war of anti-japanese aggression，but all were within this basic framework.

　　the outbreak of full-scale civil war and the beginning of the cold war betweenwashington and moscow in the summer of 1946made the leaders of the cpc change thebasic views they had held since the summer of 1942，and the concept of an "intermediaryzone"was raised.this concept had rich connotations and far-reaching significance.one element of this concept was that the rivalry between america and the sovietunion would not decidedly influence the situation in china.6however，the conceptof an "intermediary zone"lasted for only a short period in the minds of the cpcleadership.

　　in september 1947the communist and workers ‘parties of nine european countriesestablished information bureau and issued a declaration stating that the world hadbeen divided into two camps ，the anti-imperialist democratic camp headed by thesoviet union and the imperialist camp headed by the united states.although thedeclaration made no mention of the major significance of the chinese revolution ，the cpc central committee lost no time in welcoming the theory of "two camps"anddeclared that it would side with the soviet camp.

　　from the spring of 1948，the communist leaders began to express their ardentdesire to strengthen their ties with the soviet union and make urgent politicaland ideological preparations for this new development within the party.liu shaoqistated in a simple and straightforward manner in an article that in the currentsituation it was impossible to remain neutral ，and that forming an alliance ornot forming an alliance with the soviet union was "a demarcation line between revolutionand counter-revolution，"and "a demarcation line between progress and retrogression"for a nation.7

　　when the communist leaders began to map out their foreign policies they hada relatively profound and fixed understanding of the world political.situationand the trends of development ，i.e.，that "conflict between the two blocs headed respectively by americaand the soviet union is the most fundamental conflict ，and the struggle betweenthe two blocs is a life-and-death struggle."8in this sense ，the policy "to leanto one side ，"that is ，towards the soviet union ，embodied the communist leaders‘general view of the division of world political forces and trends of development.

　　as noted by some scholars ，the term "leaning to one side"also had anothermeaning ，and was put forward as the "general fundamental principle of the party."when he advocated to one side in "on the people ‘s democratic dictatorship"maozedong was answering a question greater than diplomatic strategy -the questionof the road china would follow.the logical inference was that mao zedong ’s considerationof new china‘s diplomatic strategy was closely linked to the nations developmentstrategy，and that the former was also closely linked to the communist leadership’s decision to set up a people ‘s democratic government and follow the socialistroad .

　　in recent years chinese scholars have begun to study the way in which the chinesecommunist leaders adjusted their basic domestic policies in an effort to forge analliance with the soviet union.newly released archives also show that during mikoyan‘s visit to xibaipo and lui shaoqi ’s visit to moscow the chinese communist leadersdevoted a great deal of effort to bring chinese general and specific domestic policiesin line with those of the soviet union.it can be definitely stated that it wouldhave been difficult for the soviet union to accept new china as an ally if no agreementhad been reached between the cpc and moscow on the chinese communists ‘domesticpolicies.against the background of two opposed international political and economicsystems ，the ultimate result of high legal coordination between the cpc ’s domesticand foreign policies and those of moscow was that new china entered into the politicaland economic system headed by the soviet union.

　　"leaning to one side"involved two aspects：forming an alliance with the sovietunion and the "non-recognition‘’of imperialist countries.the latter also demonstratedtke revolutionary nature of new china ‘s diplomacy in its embryonic form.in decidingto become an "ally"of the soviet union ，the cpc central committee also adoptedthe principle of non-recognition of western nations ，that is，it was in no hurryto establish diplomatic relations with countries such as america and great britain，and would be in no hurry to do so for a fairly long period after the founding ofnew china so that the influence of imperialist forces could be completely eradicated.9

　　the decision of the cpc central committee was attributable to two main considerations：one was to put an end to the century-long history of humiliating diplomacy ，which was also a necessary commitment of the chinese revolution.the other moreimportant reason was to prevent america interfering in the chinese revolution.

　　the american government released the state department ‘s white paper on china-usrelations on 5august 1949，which received prompt and severe criticism from thecpc.the five commentaries written successively by mao zedong demonstrated thatthe struggle between intervention and anti-intervention that unfolded in relationto the developmental path for new china was defined by the cpc leadership as themain element in the confrontation between new china and america.the definitionof the nature of the sino-american confrontation，the alliance with the soviett union ，the complete elimination of american influence in china immediately afterthe founding cf new china ，and other similar measures demonstrated that coordinatingsino-american relations would be an extremely difficult and protracted affair ，even if the korean war had not occurred.

　　ii.three major policy decisions and the domestic orientation of new china‘s diplomacy

　　for a long time chinese scholars have emphasized the complete difference betweenthe diplomacy of new china and that of the fast.in fact，there was continuitybetween the diplomacy of new china and that of the past ，as demonstrated by itsdomestic orientation.by domestic orientation we mean that chinese foreign policiesas a whole were formulated to achieve domestic

　　political objectives and were swayed by domestic politics.this feature canbe traced back to the mid nineteenth century and lasted into the twentieth century.previous studies have shown that from the end of the anti -japanese war to the foundingof the people ‘s republic of china the needs of domestic .political struggle werealways one of the cpc central committee ’s main considerations in determining itsforeign policies.this practice would inevitably influence the foreign policiesof new china.10

　　the first and the most important diplomatic move after the founding of new chinawas the conclusion of a treaty of alliance with the soviet union.during mikoyan‘s visit to xibaiko and liu shaoqi ’s visit to moscow the leaders of the two stateshad discussed how to handle the old sino-soviet treaty and the possibility of signinga new one.when mao zedong paid a visit to moscow soon after the founding of newchina ，the main problem to be resolved was the concluding of a new treaty.duringhis first meeting with stalin on 26deccmber 1949，mao zedong declared that ，"china now needs a breathing spell of three to five years to restore its economyto the pre -war level and to stabilize the nation."，。wwW.11665.cOmhe also pointed to theobjectives in forging an alliance with the soviet union ，that is，that chinalooked to moscow for security safeguards，political support and economic assistance，and a new sino-soviet treaty would secure these requirements.at first stalin clearlyruled out the possibility of concluding a new treaty.11

　　according to a telegram mao zedong sent to the cpc central committee，it wasonly during his talks with molotov and others that evening that the soviet sideagreed to sign a new treaty.mao zedong told them that a new treaty would commandsupport from the chinese people from all walks of life，and be of help in dealingwith the treaties signed by old china with imperialist countries.12thereafter，mao zedong continued to persuade the soviet side that the new treaty should reflectthe "completely new relationships ‘’between the two countries.``some of the chinesepeople are very unhappy with the existing sino-soviet treaty，‘’he emphasized.13obviously mao zedong used the difficulties he had encountered at home as a pivotfor soviet concessions.considering the situation at that at that time there ison reason to doubt that mao zedong‘s major concern was centered around domesticpolitical .
　zhou enlai proved to be a tough negotiator in later talks related to the conclusionof a new treaty ，which astonished the soviet delegates，who asked，"how canthe soviet union and china be regarded as allies now that things are going thisway ？"14on returning after signing the sino-soviet treaty of friendship ，allianceand mutual assistance ，mao zedong emphasized that the new treaty was a "patrioticone"and accorded with the needs of economic construction and national securityin china.15the disturbances in china that followed in the wake of the signing ofagreements in march on the setting up of the sino-soviet petroleum and non-ferrousmetal joint-stock companies provided indirect evidence of the necessity for maozedong‘s statement.it can be seen from the document drafted by liu shaoqi thatthe two agreements had raised doubts among the students and were sharply criticizedby them.16